Encryption During Backup, at Rest and in Transit: What Is the Difference?

Encryption During Backup, at Rest and in Transit: What Is the Difference?

Your company's data needs a lock at three moments: when a backup copy is made, while the data sits on a disk, and while it travels between computers or over the internet. Encryption during backup locks the copy before it leaves your computer, so whoever stores it sees only gibberish. Encryption at rest keeps disks locked, so a stolen laptop or server is useless to the thief. Encryption in transit makes sure nobody can read or change data on the way. Each one protects against different dangers, none of them is enough on its own – and for all three, the most important question is the same: who holds the key?

Why this is a business question, not just an IT one

Encryption decides whether a stolen laptop is an annoyance or a reportable data breach. The European Data Protection Board (EDPB) compares two cases in its guidance:

  • A day-care centre loses two tablets in a break-in. They were encrypted, switched off and protected by strong passwords, the data was backed up, and the centre wiped them remotely. Result: no report to the authority, no letters to parents – just an internal record.
  • A service company loses an employee's laptop with the names, addresses and dates of birth of more than 100,000 customers. No password, no encryption. Result: the breach must be reported to the authority and the customers must be informed.

GDPR says it plainly: if the data was "unintelligible to any person who is not authorised to access it, such as encryption", you don't have to inform each affected person. Encryption is also part of the legal minimum under NIS2 – see what NIS2 and GDPR require for backups and encryption. It is one of the pillars of cybersecurity and data protection, but each kind of encryption covers a different risk.

1. Encryption during backup: the locked case

Imagine sending your company's files to an archive warehouse. You can simply trust the warehouse – or you can first put everything in locked cases and keep the only key. The warehouse stores the cases but can't look inside.

That's encryption during backup. The copy is locked on your own computer, before it goes anywhere – to a backup server in the next room, a disk at a second office or rented storage space. Anyone with access to the place where the copies are kept – an administrator, a provider, a burglar – sees only scrambled data.

The free, open-source backup programs we work with are built this way. One encrypts "all data before it leaves your machine", file names included, and doesn't allow unencrypted backups at all. Another is designed to keep backups safe "in a location that is not completely trusted".

What it does not do: it doesn't stop anyone from deleting the copies. One of these programs says openly that it is "not designed to protect against attackers deleting files at the storage location". That's why the copies also need a place the attack cannot reach – a copy the virus cannot delete, plus one at a second location. More on this in how ransomware hits small and medium businesses.

2. Encryption at rest: the safe that opens for your staff

Think of an office safe that is locked every evening and opened by authorised staff in the morning. Encryption at rest does the same for disks: everything on the laptop, server or backup drive is stored locked. Once the computer is started and unlocked by an authorised person, data is unlocked automatically as it is read and locked again as it is saved. In daily work, nobody notices.

What it protects against: theft or loss of the device itself. A stolen laptop, a server carried out of the office, a disk sent for repair or thrown away – without the key, the data on them is unreadable. That's the day-care case above: the tablets were switched off and locked.

What it does not protect against: threats inside a running system. While the computer is on and unlocked, the data is open to every program and user with access – including a virus that came in through an employee's email. The technical documentation on disk encryption is frank about it: storage encryption "can only provide limited protection" against attacks on a running system, and while the key is loaded, the data is protected not by the encryption itself but by the system's ordinary access rules. A locked disk doesn't stop ransomware. A good backup does.

3. Encryption in transit: an armoured van instead of a postcard

Unencrypted data on the move is like a postcard: anyone it passes can read it, and even change it. Encryption in transit puts it in a sealed armoured van. The international standard for secure internet connections is designed, in its own words, "to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery".

For a business, this matters in three places:

  • your website and online services – customer data in forms and logins;
  • backups sent to a second location – the copy should travel through a locked connection, even if it is already encrypted;
  • staff working from home or on the road – their connection to the company's files.

For remote work, the best option is a secure connection only your people can use. Each laptop or phone gets its own digital key, everything sent through the connection is encrypted and checked, and traffic that doesn't come from a registered device is dropped. Your file server doesn't need to be open to the internet at all.

What it does not do: it protects data only on the way. Once the data arrives, it is only as safe as the place where it lands.

The three side by side

During backupAt restIn transit
Everyday pictureA locked case in someone else's warehouseAn office safe, open during working hoursAn armoured van instead of a postcard
Protects againstPrying eyes where copies are stored; a stolen backup diskA stolen or lost laptop, server or disk; disks sent for repair or scrappedEavesdropping and tampering on the way
Does not protect againstDeletion of the copies; a computer infected before the backupA virus or intruder on a running, unlocked systemAnything before sending or after arrival

The real question: who holds the key?

"The provider encrypts it" is not the same as "only you hold the key". Cloud storage services often encrypt data automatically – Amazon's cloud storage, for example, has encrypted all new uploads by default since January 2023. But look at how its documentation describes this: the service encrypts your data as it writes it to disk "and decrypts it for you when you access it". That protects against a disk walking out of the provider's data centre. Because the provider holds the key, its systems can unlock your data – and so can anyone who gets into your account with the right permissions. The same documentation describes the alternative: with client-side encryption, "you manage the encryption process, encryption keys, and related tools", and the provider only ever receives locked data.

When you hold the key, the data stays yours – wherever the copies are kept.

Lose the key, lose the data. This is the other side of the coin, and the documentation is blunt: "Losing your password means that your data is irrecoverably lost"; "there is no way to recover a forgotten password because only you know it". No helpline can reset it. So:

  • keep a copy of every key offline – for example printed on paper and sealed in the company safe or a bank deposit box. One program's documentation recommends paper, and warns that a key copy kept only on the computer being backed up is "NOT sufficient";
  • make sure at least two trusted people know where that copy is;
  • write down what each key opens, and check the keys every time you test a restore.

The EU's detailed cybersecurity rules for digital service providers ask for the same: backed-up keys, a way to recover lost keys and a plan for keys that may have been exposed.

When a provider-held key is fine: if nobody in your company can take responsibility for a key, a reputable cloud service that manages keys for you may be the more realistic choice for less sensitive data – a forgotten key is worse than a provider's key. For customer and employee data, and for anything that falls under NIS2, holding the key yourself is worth it. We compare both options in own backup system vs. cloud backup service.

Five questions to ask your IT provider

  1. Are our backups encrypted before they leave our computers – and who holds the key?
  2. Are our laptops and servers encrypted, so that a stolen device reveals nothing?
  3. Do people working remotely reach our files only through a secure connection that only our devices can use?
  4. Where is the spare copy of each key, and who can reach it if you are unavailable?
  5. Is there a copy of our data that a virus on our network cannot delete – and when did we last test a restore from it?

Who holds the keys to your data?

If you are not sure, it is worth finding out before it is too late. Call us and we will check which data is protected, which is not, and who can actually read it.

With our Cybersecurity and data protection service your data is encrypted during backup, at rest and in transit, and only you hold the keys. The system sits in your company, with no monthly fees.

Write to us +359 89 575 4081

Sources

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